The anonymization claim
Anonymized tracking is still tracking.
The claim that this data is truly anonymous, or "scrubbed," is a foundational element of the surveillance industry's marketing, designed to appease privacy concerns while preserving the commercial and operational utility of the database. In reality, the value of this data is immense, and the concept of "anonymization" in the context of persistent, location-based tracking is a fiction.
The myth of anonymization in spatiotemporal data.
Here is the breakdown of why this data remains highly valuable and how it exposes individuals despite claims of redaction.
In the world of data science, location data, meaning records of where a specific vehicle is at a specific time, is inherently non-anonymous. Even if you remove a name or a plate number, you are left with a "pattern of life."
If an unidentified vehicle is seen entering a community every night at 6:00 PM and at a specific office building every morning at 8:30 AM, you have essentially identified the individual associated with that vehicle without ever needing a license plate number.
By correlating these movement patterns with other public datasets, such as property records, voter rolls and social media check-ins, "connecting the dots" is not just possible; it is trivial for automated systems.
The value of "anonymized" aggregates.
Even without identifying specific individuals, the data is a goldmine for several reasons.
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Predictive modeling
Selling aggregate traffic patterns, peak congestion times, and movement flow between jurisdictions is extremely valuable to commercial interests, urban planners, and insurance companies.
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Behavioral profiling
Corporations and intelligence gatherers use "anonymized" movement data to identify high-value targets, track the influence of political events, or map the social and economic activity of specific neighborhoods, all of which are actionable without knowing the name of every driver.
The strategy of de-identification.
When companies claim they scrub personally identifiable information, they are usually referring to stripping out the name, address, or owner info linked directly to the plate in their internal database. However, they retain the "unique identifier" of the plate itself. Because the plate is persistent, it acts as a permanent tracking ID.
The system doesn't need to know the driver's name to know that the same vehicle, meaning the same person, has been spotted 400 times in a month. The tracking remains continuous; only the link to the government registration record is ostensibly "hidden" from certain users.
This is not merely a technical issue; it is a feature of the surveillance state. By creating a massive, centralized, and "anonymized" database, Flock and its partners achieve two goals:
- They can claim they are not tracking "people," just "data points."
- They build a permanent, searchable historical record of human movement that is available to any entity with enough money or the right "mutual aid" access.
In short, "anonymized" tracking is still tracking.
The ability to identify an individual through movement patterns is a standard capability of modern data analytics. When you possess the coordinates and timestamps for a specific vehicle's daily habits, you have stripped away the privacy of the person operating that vehicle, regardless of whether you have attached a name to the file.
Your county taxes pay for all of this.
The county commissioners approve the sheriff's budget and the renewal cost. Email your commissioner to let them know that we the people are against this.